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Abstract
Using smartphones for peer-to-peer communication over the Internet is
difficult without the aid of centralized services. These centralized services,
which usually reside in the cloud, are necessary for brokering communi-
cation between peers, and all communication must pass through them. A
reason for this is that smartphones lack publicly reachable IP addresses.
Also, because people carry their smartphones with them, smartphones will
often disconnect from one network and connect to another. Smartphones
can also go offline. Additionally, a network of trusted peers (or friends)
requires a directory of known peers, authentication mechanisms, and se-
cure communication channels. In this paper, we propose a peer-to-peer
middleware that provides these features without the need for centralized
services.
Mobile peer-to-peer Friend-to-friend networking Unreachable IP ad-
dresses Location transparency.
∗This paper is a revised and extended version of Cloudless Wide Area Friend-to-Friend
Networking Middleware for Smartphones [4] ICETE 2018 conference paper. The extended
version includes the novel concept of reconnectable channels (section 4.6), which has never
been published before, including the accompanying figures. Other changes include title and
keywords, entirely rewritten abstract, introduction, sections 2 and 3, and conclusion. The
other sections have also been revised. We have replaced the many footnotes with URLs with
inline parentheses. Some webpages are now references instead of footnotes. Statistics about
Pv6 adoption and Tor relays have been updated to more recent numbers. A citation about
smartphone usage has been removed from the introduction and replaced by another.
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1 Introduction
Around 2.5 billion people in the world use smartphones
[19]. People use smartphone apps for a wide range of
online services that are important to them, such as apps
for news, banking, education, career, and health. It is
also common to use smartphones for social networking,
where the users communicate with each other and share
pictures and videos.
Smartphone apps are typically backed by services in
the cloud. The apps connect to clouds running within
large data centers, and the cloud services handle most of
the apps’ data storage and processing needs. By using a
centralized cloud service, it is also easier to share data be-
tween smartphones. For example, when someone shares
a picture via Snapchat (https://www.snapchat.com), the
picture is uploaded to Snapchat’s cloud. A cloud service
then sends notifications to the user’s friends. The friends
open the picture in their Snapchat app, which downloads
the picture from Snapchat’s cloud. The pattern is typical
for how smartphone apps communicate and share data.
The clouds thus represent centralized hubs for com-
munication and data management, which can pose var-
ious privacy problems. One problem is that the im-
pact of data breaches can be massive. Another prob-
lem is that many companies actively gather, analyze,
and sell user information on a large scale [1, 2]. Re-
moving the dependence on centralized services may be
a step towards alleviating these issues. Modern smart-
phones are also computers with processing, memory, and
storage capabilities comparable to regular desktop PCs
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less than a decade ago. With the increasing popularity
of smartphones compared to PCs [14], it may be sensi-
ble to make more use of the smartphone’s local hard-
ware as an alternative to cloud computing. For example,
smartphones can participate as nodes in a distributed
system that combine their storage and processing ca-
pabilities. Such a system should allow smartphones to
communicate directly instead of via centralized services.
Cloud-based solutions are, in essence, client-server archi-
tectures. The alternative is to use peer-to-peer communi-
cation. However, when communicating over the Internet,
smartphones rarely have reachable addresses, and they
often change networks. It is challenging to find ways
to connect smartphones over the Internet and to keep
track of network locations, which is why apps depend on
clouds or other remote application services for orches-
trating communication.
We present a novel approach to smartphone peer-to-
peer over the Internet, which aims to solve the problem of
frequent network changes and lack of publicly reachable
addresses. We introduce Swirlwave, a middleware that
does not rely on clouds and client-server architectures
– we term this cloudless. Swirlwave handles peer-to-
peer communication well in experiments. Smartphones
are directly reachable, and addresses are automatically
updated when peers change networks. We also suggest
an approach enabling continued communication when a
smartphone disconnects from a network and connects to
another.
We first describe related work. Next, the architecture
and communication methods are explained. We then
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describe the middleware, followed by experiments and
results. Finally, we discuss the findings before concluding
the paper.
2 Related Work
Turtle [16] is a theoretical friend-to-friend architecture
for safely sharing sensitive data, where the system floods
search queries throughout the network. Turtle builds
on trusted relationships between people when defining
friend-to-friend networks, which is also true for Swirl-
wave. However, Turtle is theoretical and does not ad-
dress how to connect devices. Swirlwave is a middleware
that connects the smartphones as peers over the Internet,
and it is not restricted to a particular use case.
Orbot (https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot) is an
official app for communicating over the Tor network.
Swirlwave uses Tor to make smartphones directly con-
nectable, and the implementation of Swirlwave uses some
of the same underlying libraries as Orbot. Unlike Swirl-
wave, Orbot does not solve what happens when the smart-
phone changes to another network. It also has none of
Swirlwave’s friend-to-friend networking features.
Thali (http://thaliproject.org) is an experimental plat-
form for peer-to-peer web solutions. The project is open-
source and sponsored by Microsoft. The aim is to en-
able the creation of apps that take advantage of the
smartphone’s resources and give users better control over
their data. This is comparable to Swirlwave’s objectives.
Thali, however, gave up the idea of peer-to-peer over the
Internet using Onion services [22], then called hidden
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services. The project concluded that the Onion service
protocol only is usable for stationary devices [21]. They
chose instead to focus on Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE),
Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi Direct. None of these are for wide-
area communication. Swirlwave supports wide-area com-
munication over the Internet.
3 Mobile Peer-to-Peer Communication Without
Public IP Address
In this section, We explain why non-public IP addresses
is a challenge, our solution, and the architecture of the
system.
3.1 Unreachable Addresses
When a smartphone connects to the Internet, it is usually
behind network address translation (NAT). The smart-
phone is, in reality, connected to a local area network
(LAN) and communicates with the Internet through a
router. Only the router’s address is visible from the In-
ternet, e.g., a server will only see the router’s address
when it is contacted by a smartphone. The server replies
to the router, which routes the traffic to the smartphone
on the LAN [7]. The IP addresses within the LAN are
not valid outside. Additionally, local IP addresses are
commonly assigned dynamically by a DHCP-server, so
the smartphone’s address can change each time it recon-
nects to the LAN. The consequence of DHCP is that the
addresses are unpredictable inside the LAN. More im-
portantly, the consequence of NAT is that others cannot
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Figure 1: Friend-to-friend network [4]
reach the smartphone from the Internet, which prevents
peer-to-peer communication. This is true both for Wi-Fi
and cellular data.
3.2 Architecture
Swirlwave belongs to a family of peer-to-peer architec-
tures called friend-to-friend networking [5]. Friend-to-
friend networks are unstructured and private. Peers only
connect directly to already known peers (friends) [18].
The friendships are mutual (commutative), but not tran-
sitive, which means that a friend of a friend is not auto-
matically accepted.
Figure 1 illustrates that A, B, and D are friends that
all know each other. The same does not apply to C,
which is a friend of B but does not know anyone else.
Peer C can only contact B directly. Nevertheless, C can
reach others indirectly if B relays requests to its friends.
A and D can relay the request to other friends, and so
on, thus enabling far-reaching queries.
Friend-to-friend networks can be used for distributed
systems where the included nodes should not be known
outside the system. For example, a company can connect
its smartphones as part of a closed system. Friend-to-
friend networks can also be used to define private social
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networks. The peers in the network can act as clients
and servers at the same time. They can provide services
that other peers can use. At the same time, they can be
clients that consume services provided by others.
Swirlwave is a middleware that hides the complexity
of friend-to-friend networking from the apps that use it.
The apps do not know the location of the other peers
or that Tor is used as an underlying protocol. Instead,
they connect to localhost with ordinary TCP sockets
when they wish to communicate with remote peers. The
middleware automatically routes traffic between smart-
phones.
Swirlwave defines two proxies for handling the routing:
The client-proxy, and the server-proxy. Both run locally
on the smartphone. Figure 2 illustrates two peers, where
the left peer acts as a client, and the right peer acts as
a server. The app layer connects to the locally running
client proxy via TCP. It can do this because the client
proxy listens to a range of ports. Each port numbers is
associated with a specific friend and service. The client
proxy then uses the SOCKS4a [13] protocol to connect
to a friend through a locally running Tor onion service.
3.3 Tor and Tor Onion Services
Tor (https://www.torproject.org) was made for anonymity,
while Swirlwave uses it for connectivity purposes.
Tor conceals online activity by routing encrypted traf-
fic through layers of dedicated onion routers, often com-
pared to the layers of an onion. The Tor network is
public and has more than 6,500 running volunteer re-
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Figure 2: Proxying from client to server [4]
lays, per July 2019 (https://metrics.torproject.org). All
traffic passes through at least three onion routers before
reaching the destination — the onion routers at each end
of a connection act as proxies for entering the network.
The onion proxy on the client side has a directory of
available onion routers. It picks out the routers that it
wants to use, and Tor builds a circuit. Each router in
the circuit only knows its successor and predecessor. The
onion proxy at the end of the connection sends traffic to
the final destination, which is an ordinary server that is
unaware of Tor. The protocol conceals the client’s iden-
tity from the server, not the other way around.
If we wish to hide the server’s location from clients, we
can use the Tor Onion Service protocol (previously called
hidden services). In this protocol, the server registers
itself with the Tor network to obtain an onion address.
Clients can reach the server through the Tor network by
using this address. The protocol aims to ensure that the
server’s location remains unknown to the clients.
Swirlwave utilizes an unintended consequence of the
onion service protocol, which is NAT traversal. When a
server registers as an onion service and obtains an onion
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address, it must actively connect to the Tor network. To
be available from the network, it keeps this connection
open. If the server is behind NAT, the protocol still
works because NAT only hinders connections coming in
from the Internet, not in the opposite direction [7]. The
consequence is that we can obtain an address that can
reach devices behind NAT. Tor also has the advantage of
being a public overlay network that is open to anyone.
Swirlwave uses onion services to reach smartphones
over the Internet. It runs an onion proxy locally at each
smartphone. However, Tor does not solve all the chal-
lenges. Smartphones frequently change networks as peo-
ple carries them around in their daily life. Onion ser-
vices do not work well in this scenario. When a smart-
phone changes its location, it can theoretically continue
to use the same onion address. The problem is that
other smartphones that have already built circuits to it
will continue to send traffic to the old location. Also,
there is no protocol transparency. Apps must use the
SOCKS4a protocol and know how about onion services
to use them. The Swirlwave middleware provides this
missing location and protocol transparency.
4 Swirlwave
Swirlwave is used to build friend-to-friend networks. Each
peer keeps a directory of friends. The middleware auto-
matically manages addresses changes and updates the
directory. Swirlwave uses onion addresses to reach peers
without publicly visible IP addresses. Anonymity is cen-
tral in Tor, but Swirlwave requires authentication of friends.
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Table 1: Information in a contact list record [4]
Field name Description
Name A human-readable name of the friend
Peer ID An ID that is unique across all installations
Address The friend‘s onion-address
Address Version Each time a peer changes its address, it will increment the address version number.
Secondary Address The phone number used when sending SMS-messages to the peer
Public-key The public-key from the friend’s asymmetric keys
Online Status Offline if last attempt to reach the friend was unsuccessful, otherwise online
Last Contact Time The last time contact was made with the peer
Known Friends A list of peer IDs for mutual friends
Capabilities A list of capabilities supported by this friend. Such as available services and protocol UUIDs
Awaiting Answer A flag indicating if an answer from the SMS fallback protocol is pending
Authentication is thus part of Swirlwave.
4.1 Contacts
Keeping track of peer addresses is one of Swirlwave’s
central features. It achieves this without external direc-
tory services or central points. Each peer in Swirlwave
keeps a local directory of known peers. New contacts
are added out-of-band, for example, by using near-field
communication (NFC).
An entry in the contact list contains data that is needed
to communicate with a peer. The entry can also include
information about services offered by the peer. Entries
contain the peer ID, onion address, services provided by
the peer, phone number (used for the SMS fallback pro-
tocol) and its public-key. See Table 1 for details.
A server and its clients must use the same protocol to
conduct meaningful communication. Swirlwave lets the
application layer decide which protocol to use. This flex-
ibility is possible by using universally unique identifiers
(UUID) [12] as identifiers for protocols. The identifier
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identifies a communication protocol that the server and
client must recognize in order to communicate. Swirl-
wave uses the identifier to match clients and servers.
For example, to send a message to a friend, a user se-
lects the friend from the Swirlwave contact list. Based on
the protocol UUIDs registered for the friend, Swirlwave
presents a list of supported protocols. If the user has a
client-app that understands the protocol, Swirlwave de-
tects it by matching the identifiers of the local app with
the identifier of the friend’s service.
4.2 Authentication and Confidentiality
Each peer has a key-pair for public-key encryption [10].
The key-pair is used for authentication purposes. Also,
Swirlwave can use it for ensuring confidentiality, integrity,
and non-repudiation of data when communicating over
other channels than Tor. When using onion services, the
traffic is end-to-end encrypted, so this already provides
the needed communication confidentiality.
Anonymity is usually an essential feature of Tor. The
onion proxy on the server side will not know the origin of
incoming connections. In our approach, this anonymity
hinders the identification of incoming requests from friends.
Swirlwave solves this by providing an authentication mech-
anism that validates the incoming connections. This
functionality is part of the Swirlwave proxies and based
on public-key cryptography.
When a client-peer wants to establish a new connec-
tion, the client-side proxy sends a system message to the
server-peer. The client has encrypted the message with
11
Figure 3: Establishing connection [4]
its private key. The server-side proxy decrypts the mes-
sage with the client’s public key to validate the identity
of the sender. If the server-peer cannot validate the iden-
tity, it refuses the connection.
4.3 Establishing Connections
To establish a connection, a request is sent from a Swirl-
wave client proxy via the onion proxy. The message
header contains (among others) the friend’s onion-address.
If the onion proxy returns a positive response code (0x5A)
telling that it successfully connected to the remote onion
service, the client proxy also receives a four-byte num-
ber. This number is later returned to the server as part
of the connection message. If the server proxy accepts
the connection (after assessing the connection message)
it responds with a success code (0x10). The client proxy
then begins reading and writing bytes between the in-
coming socket from the application-layer client and the
outbound onion proxy socket. Figure 3 illustrates this
communication.
Everything in a connection message, except the client
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Table 2: Connection message information [4]
Field name Description
Sender ID The peer ID of the client
Random Number A random number initially generated and sent by the server proxy
Message Type Whether this is a system message or an application-layer connection
Destination An identifier of a capability representing a service that the client wishes to consume.
This will only be set for application-layer connections.
System Message A system message that will be dispatched to a module that handles system messages.
This will only be set for system message types.
ID, is encrypted with the client’s private-key. The server
proxy looks up the peer ID in the contact list and rejects
the connection if it does not recognize the peer. If the
peer ID is in the contact list, its public-key is used to
decrypt the message. If the message successfully is de-
crypted, and the returned number equals the one that
the server earlier sent to the client, the connection is ap-
proved. The connection message also specifies whether
the connection will be used for for transmitting system
messages or application-layer data. For an application-
layer connection, the server proxy will use an identifier
found in the destination field, match it to a local service
endpoint, and establish a connection to the application-
layer service. For a system message, instead the content
of the message field is dispatched to an internal module
that manages system messages. See Table 2 for a list of
the information included in the connection message.
When the onion proxy fails to connect to the remote
onion service, the client proxy marks the peer as being
offline. It then begins the process of getting an updated
address to the peer, either by asking a mutual friend, or
by using an SMS fallback protocol which contacts the
peer directly. The client proxy will not attempt to es-
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tablish new connections to the friend until an updated
address is obtained. The friend will then be marked as
online again.
4.4 Address Changes
When a smartphone moves from one network to another,
for example, from cellular data to Wi-Fi, its access point
is no longer the same. The IP address will most likely
be different, and the route to the device will definitely
be different.
Such address changes must be announced to friends. A
device that has been offline, or has changed its location,
will contact its friends as soon as it is online again. The
new address is passed with a version number. The ver-
sion number increases whenever a peer changes address,
and it is used to determine which is the most recent ad-
dress when comparing across peers.
After a peer has been offline, it is not unlikely that
some friends have changed their addresses. The peer
will not have received the updated address, and will not
be able to reach them. The previously offline peer can
either ask mutual friends about the friend’s new address
or contact the friend directly via a fallback protocol using
SMS.
Assume that peer B, in Figure 4, has changed its ad-
dress. It sends a system message (marked 1) including
the new address to three friends. Peer A successfully re-
ceives the address and updates its contact list. The other
peers cannot be reached. When C and D later tries to
contact B, they discover that B is unreachable. They
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Figure 4: Peer B changes address [4]
will then try to obtain an updated address. Peer A is a
mutual friend of D and B. D can ask A for B’s address
(marked 2a). Peer C, on the other hand, does not have
any other friends to ask. Instead, it uses an SMS to ask
B directly for its address (marked 2b). Phone numbers
can be seen as stable addresses that will work even when
a peer has changed its network location.
Swirlwave uses onion addresses to connect to peers.
Routing is still dependent on IP addresses under the
hood, just as with all Internet traffic. When a peer
changes its network, the IP and route to it change as
well. While it is possible to reuse an onion address at
the new location, there is no support for letting clients
refresh the route to the onion service. Swirlwave thus
monitors network changes and registers a new onion ser-
vice when the smartphone connects to a new network.
An exception is if a network and access point address
is recognized from earlier. Then the onion service and
address from last time can be reused.
4.5 SMS Fallback Protocol
An SMS fallback protocol is used to request new ad-
dresses from friends when they cannot found at their
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previously known onion address. When the client proxy
of peer C discovers that it cannot connect to a friend,
B, and there are no other friends to ask for the address,
it will send a data SMS to B. Unlike a text SMS, a
data SMS will not be visible to the user. It will instead
be received by the Swirlwave middleware running on the
smartphone.
The fallback protocol begins by C sending B an SMS
that includes C’s address and a secret one-time code. C
has encrypted the message with its private key. The one-
time code has several purposes; it enables duplicate mes-
sage detection, and it is a message-ID and anti-forgery
token that later will be returned to C.
B looks up C’s phone number in its contact directory,
to confirm that the SMS is from a known friend. B de-
crypts the message and updates the contact list with C’s
address. If Swirlwave is running and connected, an an-
swer immediately is sent to C over the Internet including
B’s current address. Otherwise, C will get an answer as
soon as B reconnects. In the answer, B sends its new
address together with the one-time code that C sent ear-
lier. B has encrypted the message with its private key.
C updates the contact list with B’s new address when it
receives the message.
4.6 Reconnectable Channels
So far, we have described how peers automatically an-
nounce address changes and how they keep track of each
other. However, when a peer disconnects from one net-
work location to connect to another, it will necessarily
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break any open connections to its peers. The peer will
not be available for others until it has finished the process
of changing its network location. This frequent breaking
of connections is undesirable from an application per-
spective, and it can affect the user experience negatively.
The underlying middleware should instead hide the in-
stabilities from the application, whenever possible.
In this section, we propose the concept of reconnectable
channels. The aim is that if peers A and B are communi-
cating over a connection, and peer A changes its network,
then the applications on A and B can continue unaffected
for a while. Within this time frame, A has the opportu-
nity to reconnect to B and resume communication from
where it got lost. If successful, the applications will be
unaware of the temporary disconnect.
The enabling factor for implementing reconnectable
channels is the use of client and server proxies, which al-
ready provide location and protocol transparency. When
two peers communicate, all traffic passes through the lo-
cal proxies on each side. On both sides, each proxy keeps
two sockets: One socket connects the proxy to a locally
running application, the other socket connects the proxy
to the external network. The proxy sits in between the
two sockets and transfers data back and forth, from one
to the other.
When a peer disconnects from the network, the con-
nections between the proxies and the external network
inevitably become closed on both sides of the ongoing
communication. However, the situation is very different
for the sockets that connect the proxies and local appli-
cations. These connections are purely local and are unaf-
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Proxy
Local
External
Figure 5: The connection between the proxy and the external peer is closed,
but the connection between the application and the proxy is still open.
fected by the status of the external network. Thus, they
are still available to the applications. Figure 5 shows that
the application connection is still open after the external
connection has closed.
For a limited time, a local proxy can hide that the
connection to the external network has closed from an
application. It does this by keeping the connection to
the application open and simulate a low transfer rate.
The proxy continues to read and write data at a rate just
high enough to keep the connection alive by preventing
a timeout. The application can receive and send data as
before.
The proxy continues to receive data from the appli-
cation, but it has nowhere to send the data because the
intended recipient is temporarily disconnected. Instead,
the proxy stores the data in a buffer. If the external re-
cipient successfully reconnects within a reasonable time,
it will send the buffered data to it. This is illustrated in
Figure 6.
Broken TCP-connections are only detected when try-
ing to send data, not during reading [6]. The sender
18
Application
Proxy
Local
Buffer
Figure 6: The external connection is temporarily unavailable, and the proxy has
started using buffers instead.
expects an acknowledgment from the other end of the
connection that the data was received. Reading data
from a connection in TCP is a passive act and does re-
quire an acknowledgment. An application will not detect
a broken connection through reading operations. The
phenomenon is known as a half-open connection. There
is no need for the proxy to send data to the application
to hide that the external connection is down.
After a device has finished changing its network lo-
cation, it will attempt to restore the previously ongoing
communication with its peers. The proxy will open sock-
ets to the peers, and send reconnection messages request-
ing to reestablish and continue the communication. On
success, the proxies on both sides of the communication
will start sending their buffered data over the external
network, now at high speed. The local proxy does not
read at maximum speed from the application socket until
it has finished sending the buffered data to the external
peer.
Another challenge that arises is that data can become
lost on its way from the source to the destination when
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a connection closes abruptly. There will be a discrep-
ancy between what the source (A) has sent and what
the destination (B) has received. After reestablishing
the communication between A and B, the data transfer
should continue from the last data that B received. It
should not continue from the last data that A sent.
Consequently, B must tell A where to resume the data
transfer. The sender (A) must always remember the
most recent data that it has sent to B. The proxies
achieve this through the use of buffers. A proxy will
gradually fill a buffer with data as it has sent, and when
the buffer is full, the proxy will begin filling it up from
the beginning. The proxy does not clear the buffer before
starting at the beginning again, so the buffer constitutes
a sliding window over the data that A already has sent.
On the other side, B will maintain a counter for how
much data it has received, which B sends to A on a re-
connect. The modulo of the buffer size can be used to
calculate the index of the last received data and if the
data is still available. In this way, it is possible to resume
the communication between A and B without any loss of
data due to a disconnect.
Lastly, each peer can have multiple connections to
many other peers simultaneously. To properly recon-
nect, each connection has an associated identifier. If A
wants to reconnect to B, it has to send a message in-
cluding this identifier. B will then look up information
locally to verify that A indeed was the other side of the
communication before the connection broke.
In this section, we have introduced the concept of re-
connectable channels, which seamlessly enables applica-
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tions to continue communicating with peers even when
connections break due to network location changes on
either side.
5 Experiments
We conducted several experiments with the middleware.
Testing included the functionality of the system, as well
as location transparent communication, performance mea-
surements, startup time, connection establishment time,
throughput, transmission time, and latency. In this sec-
tion, we describe the results.
5.1 Peer-to-Peer Communication
We have tested using Swirlwave for establishing connec-
tions over the network, connecting to peers, and trans-
ferring data. In the experiments, we also tested how the
system handles location changes.
In one experiment, two smartphones connected as peers.
A webcam app ran on one smartphone, and the other
smartphone showed the live stream in a browser. Swirl-
wave made this possible while both smartphones were
connected to 4G from different providers, without the
usually required streaming via clouds or similar central-
ized services. We also demonstrated that smartphones
were able to change between 4G and Wi-Fi during stream-
ing. In that case, the smartphones update each other’s
onion addresses, and the streaming continues.
The browser on the client smartphone connects to a
port on localhost. Thus, from the browser’s point of
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view, the webcam seems to be on the local smartphone.
However, Swirlwave manages the current onion address
to the peer and routes the traffic to the correct smart-
phone via Tor. This means the browser can continue
to use the localhost-address and can be kept unaware
of network changes. This is a demonstration of location
transparency and streaming from anywhere without be-
ing connected to Wi-Fi.
5.2 Performance
We compared with two alternative configurations when
evaluating the performance; one where we used Tor di-
rectly without Swirlwave, and one where we used a plain
Internet connection.
We used two smartphones during the experiments. A
Huawei P9 Lite was used as a client. It was connected to
the Internet via cellular data (4G). A Samsung Galaxy
Note 4 was used as a server. It was connected to the
Internet via Wi-Fi. The experiments were carried out
within a short time-frame.
Orbot, which is the official version of the Tor onion
routing service on Android, was used to test Tor with-
out Swirlwave. Orbot can be used to connect the smart-
phones, but it has no mechanism for changing addresses
when a smartphone changes location. It is still enough
for conducting the experiments.
We used an Internet subscription with a static, public
IP address for the experiments, which enabled us to man-
ually assign a publicly visible IP to the smartphone that
acted as a server. A wireless router was manually config-
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ured to forward from a specific port on that smartphone.
The server smartphone could then be contacted directly
from the Internet. The limitation of this approach, com-
pared to Swirlwave, is that the server smartphone cannot
be reached as soon as it leaves the manually configured
Wi-Fi. Also, the smartphone cannot take the role as a
server when connected to cellular data.
5.2.1 Starting Onion Proxy
The experiment measured how long it took from the
onion proxy was started until the onion service was regis-
tered and ready for use. The difference between starting
a new onion service and reusing an existing one was com-
pared.
The implementation of Swirlwave can reuse an already
registered onion service when it reconnects to a network
location recognized from before. As seen in Table 3,
there is a difference in onion proxy start-up times be-
tween registering a new onion service and reconnecting
to one that is already registered (which skips the reg-
istration process). Registering a new onion service took
around twice as long. The start-up time also varied more
when registering new onion services compared to reusing
an address. When comparing the 90th percentiles, the
start-up time when reusing an address was about five
times faster than when registering a new onion address.
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Table 3: Onion proxy start-up times [4]
Median 90th Percentile Num. Trials
New onion service 18.080s 43.941s 10
Reused onion service 8.401s 8.855s 10
Table 4: Times for establishing connection [4]
Median 95th Percentile Num. Trials
Connecting via Swirlwave 1.829s 3.557s 100
Onion service w/Orbot 1.384s 2.931s 100
Directly over Internet 1.827s 3.597s 100
5.2.2 Establishing Connections
How long it took to establish a connection between client
and server for the three different cases:
• Connecting via Swirlwave. This includes the time it
takes to authenticate the client.
• Both client and server use Orbot.
• Connecting directly over the Internet.
Our experiments showed that the time to establish
connections was nearly identical when connecting via
Swirlwave and directly via Internet. This was surpris-
ing because the connections in case of Swirlwave must
be made through the Tor network. Also, the connec-
tion times for Swirlwave include client authentication.
Connecting via Tor using Orbot, which does not include
any authentication, was faster than connecting directly
via the Internet. This may suggest that the difference
between connecting via Tor and via the Internet roughly
equals the time Swirlwave uses to authenticate the client.
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Table 5: Throughput [4]
Median 95th Percentile Num. Trials
Swirlwave 2.510Mbps 1.380Mbps 74
Onion service w/Orbot 1.950Mbps 0.910Mbps 100
Directly over Internet 18.58Mbps 11.95Mbps 100
5.2.3 Throughput
Throughput is the rate of successful data delivery over a
communication channel [9]. Given that a connection was
established and the client was authenticated, we mea-
sured how long it took from the client started reading
the first byte until 12.5MB had been read. The rate was
then calculated.
The throughput was lower when routing via Tor than
directly over the Internet. This was true for both Swirl-
wave and Orbot. The throughput for Swirlwave was
higher than Orbot. Transmitting directly over the In-
ternet without Tor was 7.4 times faster than Swirlwave,
and 9.5 times faster than Orbot.
5.2.4 Transmission Time
Transmission time is the time it takes from the first bit
until the last bit of a message is sent from a node. Trans-
mission time depends on message size and bandwidth [9],
as shown in equation 1.
Transmissiontime = MessageSize/Bandwidth (1)
When we estimated the transmission time, the median
throughput was used in place of the bandwidth, and the
message size was set to 8 bits.
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Table 6: Transmission times [4]
Transmission Time 1 Byte (8 bits)
Swirlwave 3.200× 10−6s (3.200µs)
Onion Service w/Orbot 4.103× 10−6s (4.103µs)
Directly over Internet 4.306× 10−7s (0.4306µs)
The results show that transmission time for all alterna-
tives were very low, with the Internet-connection having
the lowest result, followed by Swirlwave and Orbot.
5.2.5 Latency
Network latency specifies how long it takes for a bit of
data to travel across the network from one node to an-
other [9]. Latency depends on several components, as
shown in equation 2.
Latency = PropagationT ime+TransmissionT ime+QueuingT ime+ProcessingT ime
(2)
We first measured round-trip time (RTT), which is the
time it takes from the client sends a byte until it receives
a response byte from the server. This had the advantage
that start and end times could be measured at the same
smartphone. RTT is described in equation 3
RTT = 2× Latency + ProcessingDelay (3)
The extra processing delay represents the time from the
byte is read by the server until it sends a response byte
to the client.
We estimated latency based on the RTT measures,
using the simplified calculation shown in equation 4.
Latency = RTT/2 (4)
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Table 7: Round-Trip Times [4]
Median 95th Percentile Num. Trials
Swirlwave 0.637s 0.816s 100
Onion service w/Orbot 0.639s 1.554s 100
Directly over Internet 0.106s 1.039s 100
Table 8: Latency [4]
RTT median Latency
Swirlwave 0.637s 0.3185s
Onion service w/Orbot 0.639s 0.3195s
Directly over Internet 0.106s 0.053s
Latencies were almost similar for Swirlwave and Or-
bot, about three tens of a second. When transmitting
directly over the Internet, the latencies were approxi-
mately six times lower.
From Table 6 we see that transmission times were
negligible when considering latency. Latency in Table
8 therefore depend on propagation time, plus the time
used for processing and queuing in the nodes.
6 Discussions
To connect to hosts behind NAT from the Internet, we
need techniques for NAT Traversal [11]. These tech-
niques circumvent the problems associated with address
translations and private IP addresses in different ways.
We considered several approaches to NAT traversal
before deciding to use Tor instead, including Virtual Pri-
vate Network (VPN) [7], UDP hole punching [11], and
SSH (https://www.ssh.com/ssh). All of the alternatives
had drawbacks that made them less desirable for use with
Swirlwave. For example, setting up VPN servers requires
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public IPs and much manual work for configuration and
management. Also, for clients to work as servents (as
both client and server), they need reserved IP addresses
or other mechanisms for locating peers. Regarding UDP
hole punching, the technique only supports UDP. It also
needs a server middlebox to establish peer-to-peer com-
munications. We considered SSH, but it requires a server
with a public IP address.
We also chose to use SMS as part of a fallback alter-
native to find addresses of friends for which the address
was no longer known. We considered gossiping, hand-
offs, and other techniques [20], but they are all more
complicated, less secure, less reliable, and require more
than two peers. We found that the SMS fallback protocol
has several advantages. SMS is available on all smart-
phones, telephone numbers are a stable address, and the
protocol works even when only two peers exist in the
friend-to-friend network. Also, it does not require extra
hardware, servers, or software to work.
The functionality and performance of Swirlwave were
measured experimentally. We find that Swirlwave han-
dles peer-to-peer communication between smartphones
well. Smartphones can act as both client and servers, and
continued communication is also possible when the de-
vices move between networks. From the experiments, we
found that the downside is the lower throughput caused
by Tor. The extra round trips and processing involved
in authenticating the client does not seem to affect the
performance considerably. The same is true for the pro-
cessing done by the Swirlwave proxies. Experiments
show that it takes time to establish a connection between
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peers. Connections should thus be kept open if possible,
instead of closing after each shorter session has finished.
In the paper, IP means IPv4 [17]. IPv4 is by far
the most widespread version as of today. However, with
the more recent IPv6 [8] version of IP, each device will
be given a public address and NAT will in theory no
longer be needed. However, a form of NAT, or something
similar, that hides the real IPv6-address will probably be
standard for privacy and security reasons. An addition to
the IPv6 protocol, called mobile IPv6, is designed to let
devices keep their address even when changing networks
[15]. In this scenario, Swirlwave would not need Tor
for connectivity, but would rather build on IPv6. The
adoption of IPv6 is still low in most countries. Per June
2019, it is about 26.9% in the U.K., 15.1% in Norway
and 46.5% in the U.S. [3]. We believe, therefore, that
Swirlwave (or similar types of middleware) will continue
to be useful in the future.
7 Conclusion
Wide area peer-to-peer for smartphones usually relies
on cloud services as brokers of communication. These
solutions thus have more in common with client-server
architectures than peer-to-peer. We have presented a
middleware that aims to remove the need for central-
ized services, which is not trivial. We have explained
the many challenges regarding peer-to-peer for smart-
phones and provided solutions for them integrated into
the middleware. The middleware hides the details from
the application layer, which can remain unaware of as-
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pects such as lack of publicly reachable IP addresses,
location changes, authentication, and security. Through
the concept of reconnectable channels, the applications
can also continue to operate during disconnects in con-
junction with network changes.
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